Getting Beyond Abstract Confusion: How the United Kingdom\u27s Jurisprudence Can Aid in Developing an Analytic Framework for Patent-Eligibility in Light of \u3ci\u3eAlice v. CLS Bank\u3c/i\u3e by Beheshti, Brendon
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts
Volume 10 | Issue 2 Article 5
10-1-2014
Getting Beyond Abstract Confusion: How the
United Kingdom's Jurisprudence Can Aid in
Developing an Analytic Framework for Patent-
Eligibility in Light of Alice v. CLS Bank
Brendon Beheshti
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact cnyberg@uw.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brendon Beheshti, Getting Beyond Abstract Confusion: How the United Kingdom's Jurisprudence Can Aid in Developing an Analytic
Framework for Patent-Eligibility in Light of Alice v. CLS Bank, 10 Wash. J. L. Tech. & Arts 137 (2014).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol10/iss2/5
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by UW Law Digital Commons (University of Washington)
WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS 
VOLUME 10, ISSUE 2 FALL 2014 
 
GETTING BEYOND ABSTRACT CONFUSION: HOW THE 
UNITED KINGDOM’S JURISPRUDENCE CAN AID IN 
DEVELOPING AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK FOR PATENT-
ELIGIBILITY IN LIGHT OF ALICE V. CLS BANK 
 
Brendon Beheshti* 
© Brendon Beheshti 
 





This Article advocates consideration of the United 
Kingdom’s jurisprudence as persuasive authority for 
implementation of a new framework for analysis of subject 
matter eligibility of computer-implemented inventions in 
light of the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Alice 
Corp. v. CLS Bank International. The U.K.’s patent 
jurisprudence provides a more developed and clear 
analytic framework that conforms to the policy objectives 
of Alice, while also avoiding the conceptual problem of 
determining what is “abstract.” The result is a more useful 
and concrete analytic framework that also reduces conflicts 
of laws, and thus can help spur innovation across the 
Atlantic. 
                                                                                                             
* Brendon Beheshti holds a B.S. in electrical engineering from University 
of California, Los Angeles; a Certificate in Marketing from University of 
California, Berkeley extension; an M.B.A. with dual-concentration in finance 
and organizational leadership from Santa Clara University; and an L.L.B. from 
the University of London (U.K). In his professional capacity, Mr. Beheshti is a 
Patent Examiner at the United States Patent and Trademark Office. 
 The views and comments expressed herein are solely the opinion of the 
author, do not reflect the performance of duties in the author’s official capacity, 
and are not endorsed by, nor should be construed as, any viewpoint official or 
unofficial of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. The author 
confirms to the best of his knowledge that no information contained herein is 
privileged, confidential, or classified. 
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The United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Alice Corp. v. 
CLS Bank International1 places patentability analysis of computer-
implemented inventions on a parallel path with that of the United 
Kingdom (U.K.) and the European Union. Both the bench and bar 
can benefit from reviewing the U.K.’s jurisprudence as persuasive 
authority when considering implementation of a new framework 
for analysis of computer-implemented inventions in light of Alice. 
The U.K.’s patent jurisprudence provides a more developed 
analytic framework that conforms to Alice. More importantly, use 
of the U.K.’s analytic approach would avoid the pitfall of inviting 
                                                                                                             
1 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
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formulaic application and claim drafting to circumvent Alice’s 
requirements. 
This Article first briefly reviews subject-matter patentability of 
computer-implemented inventions in the United States. Next, this 
Article outlines the framework of patent eligibility in the U.K., 
contrasting that approach with the requirements set forth in Alice. 
Finally, this Article discusses both practical and policy benefits of 
considering the European jurisprudence as persuasive authority in 
developing a more concrete analytic framework in light of Alice’s 
holding. 
 
I. PATENT ELIGIBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
The law relative to patentable subject matter in the United 
States starts with defining patentable subject matter; exceptions are 
then carved out. This procedure has presented certain challenges, 
specifically with respect to computer-implemented inventions. 
 
A.  Statutory Basis 
 
The statute defining patentable subject matter has remained 
relatively unchanged since 1793.2 Over 220 years ago, the 
prevailing statute provided that a patent may be issued for “any 
new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter 
and any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, 
manufacture or composition of matter.”3 
Today, the prevailing statute provides that a patent may be 
issued for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof.”4 Clearly, the legislature in the beginning of the industrial 
age did not conceive a world of programmable digital computers. 
The task of shaping the law to fit evolving times has been 
accomplished by judicial construct. 
 
                                                                                                             
2 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, 318–23 (Feb. 21, 1793) (current 
version at 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952)). 
3 Id. at 319. 
4 35 U.S.C. §101 (1952). 
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B.  Down the Rabbit Hole 
 
Judicial exceptions to patentability include natural organisms,5 
methods of employing laws of nature,6 legal contracts and entities,7 
printed matter,8 transmitted signals,9 and software per se.10 
Relative to methods, the Supreme Court held in Bilski v. Kappos 
that methods directed to “abstract ideas” are not patentable.11 What 
is deemed to be an “abstract idea” has yet to be precisely defined. 
 
C.  Bilski and the Pool of Tears 
 
After the Bilski ruling, the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (U.S.P.T.O.) established guidance for weighing various 
factors for and against patentability of process claims.12 However, 
the complicated analysis could be rendered moot by formulistic 
claim drafting, especially with computer-implemented methods. 
Establishing patent eligibility under this analysis merely required 
adequate reference to a “processor” and “memory.” Although their 
value as disclosure was at best questionable, applications often 
included figures and descriptions of generic computers to 
implement methods. Moreover, though the distinction would not 
produce a difference to a person of rudimentary familiarity with 
the art relative to computing technology, applications have 
routinely directed separate and mirror claims to the method, system 
and media implementing the same invention–with each section 
                                                                                                             
5 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980). 
6 Mayo Collaborative Servs., et al. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
1289 (2012). 
7 In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Manual of 
Patent Examining Procedure (M.P.E.P.) § 2106 (2014). 
8 In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392, 1396 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
9 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
10 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972). 
11 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
12 Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr, Acting Assoc. Comm’r for Patent 
Examination Policy, U.S.P.T.O., to the Patent Examining Corps, on Interim 
Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in View 
of Bilski v. Kappos (July 27, 2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ 
patents/law/exam/bilski_guidance_27jul2010.pdf. 
4
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accorded a different analysis for subject matter eligibility by the 
U.S.P.T.O. 
 
D.  “Abstract Ideas,” the Caucus Race, and a Long Tale 
 
The lack of clarity as to what exactly constitutes an “abstract 
idea” has caused much confusion. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc on appeal in CLS 
Bank International v. Alice Corp., 13 aptly illustrated the problem 
by producing seven different opinions by ten judges on the issue 
with no opinion supported by a majority. 
On review, the United States Supreme Court took a great stride 
in applying the analysis set forth in Mayo v. Prometheus,14 holding 
that mere recitation of a generic computer does not, in itself, make 
a method patent-eligible.15 Furthermore, the Court clarified that 
patent-eligibility does not depend on formulaic drafting of claims; 
the method, system, and medium claims of an invention stand and 
fall together.16 Unfortunately, the Court also declared “we need not 
labor to delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category 
in this case.”17 
 
E.  The Rabbit Sends a Little Bill 
 
Similar to what it did after Bilski, the U.S.P.T.O. released 
guidance faithfully outlining the general application of the analysis 
the Supreme Court outlined in Alice.18 The analysis follows two 
steps: first, determine if the claim is directed to “an abstract 
                                                                                                             
13 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
14 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). Prior to the holding in Alice, the analysis set forth 
in Mayo was applied only in biotechnology or related arts. In applying the 
analysis to computer-implemented arts, the Court extended application of the 
Mayo analysis to all art areas. 
15 Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347 at 2359. 
16 Id. at 2362–63. 
17 Id. at 2356. 
18 Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Comm’r for Patent 
Examination Policy, to the Patent Examining Corps (June 25, 2014), available 
at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/announce/alice_pec_25jun2014.pdf. 
5
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idea.”19 Non-limiting examples of “abstract ideas,” such as “[a]n 
idea of itself” are provided.20 Next, if the claim is found to include 
an “abstract idea,” then there is a requirement for “something 
significantly more,” such as improvements to another technology 
or to the functioning of the computer itself, in order to receive 
patent protection.21 In this regard, “any element, or combination of 
elements, in the claim” may be sufficient.22 
While the results are not yet apparent, it is likely that the new 
analytic framework will simply result in routine drafting 
manipulations aimed at overcoming the Alice hurdle. As with the 
Bilski analysis, where the complicated weighing of factors became 
a moot issue by simply drafting a claim to reference a generic 
processor, the current framework invites making the discovery of 
“abstract ideas” moot by simply drafting a claim to reference 
generic steps that “improve[e] . . . the functioning of the computer 
itself.”23 
For example, software applications universally function by 
reserving memory space in a computer. Best practices in computer 
programming require that reserved memory space be released after 
use. Arguably, releasing reserved memory space in a computer 
“improves” the computer by allowing the memory to be used for 
other purposes. Similarly, most software applications are installed 
using an installation package that readies the generic computer for 
installation of said software by checking for incompatibilities and 
making required changes. Thus, the steps undertaken in the 
installation process and other computer processes “improve” the 
computer by ensuring that it can execute the installed software or 
other procedure. Database-driven processes routinely require 
manipulation and configuration of resources to ensure better 
performance which, if claimed, can be argued to “improve” the 
computer’s performance in interacting with the database. 
Defragmenting a disk drive can be viewed to “improve” the 
                                                                                                             
19 Id. at 2. 
20 Id. at 3. No definition is provided as to what is or is not, exactly, “an idea 
of itself.” 
21 Id. Examples of what constitutes “something more” are non-limiting. 
22 Id. (emphasis added). 
23 Id. 
6
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computer by improving the disk drive, and thereby the computer’s 
performance.  
Recitation of such steps (which may represent little more than 
technical best practices) and incorporation of such generic material 
into specifications, while providing little value as a disclosure, may 
well be able to provide enough to pass the new subject-matter 
eligibility requirements as put forth by the Alice guidance. The 
result might not be significantly different from the bare claim 
reference to a generic processor and memory, which was employed 
to overcome the requirements under Bilski.24 
 
F.  Advice from a Caterpillar 
 
Patent practitioners in the U.K. may notice some familiar 
concepts in the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Alice. 
While there is much discussion of “abstract ideas” in Alice, the key 
teaching, as it relates to computer-implemented inventions, is more 
subtly stated. 
First, the Court in Alice provides an approving nod to 
Gottschalk v. Benson.25 Gottschalk establishes that a computer 
program, in itself, is not patent-eligible.26 We know that computer-
implemented inventions function by programming or software. As 
Alice now clarifies, that implementation by a generic computer, in 
itself, does not make the invention patent-eligible; it naturally 
follows that an invention implemented by programming or 
software inherently involves an abstract idea. Therefore, for any 
computer-implemented invention where the computer is generic, 
the first step of the Alice analysis is complete—i.e., the abstract 
idea is identified. The software is the “abstract idea” that fulfills 
the first step of the analysis. Thus, with the first step of the analysis 
summarily completed, one can turn to the second step of the Alice 
analysis to identify “something significantly more.” 
The second step necessitates “a search for an ‘inventive 
                                                                                                             
24 See Memorandum from Bahr, supra note 12. Recitation of a machine 
provides a factor weighing towards subject matter eligibility. 
25 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014). 
26 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972). 
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concept.’”27 It is here that evaluating the European and, more 
specifically, the U.K.’s approach to the question of patent-
eligibility can be informative as to developing a more concrete 
framework of analysis to meet the requirement put forth by Alice. 
 
II. EUROPE AND THE U.K.’S APPROACH 
 
In contrast to the approach in the United States, which defines 
eligible subject matter and then provides exceptions, the European 
approach initially excludes items that should not be patentable 
subject matter.28 Despite the different starting points, the two 
approaches have now substantially converged. 
 
A.  Statutory Basis 
 
In compliance with the European Patent Convention, and 
specifically in relation to computer-implemented inventions, the 
prevailing statute governing patentable subject matter in the U.K. 
provides: 
It is hereby declared that the following (among 
other things) are not inventions for the purposes of 
this Act, that is to say, anything which consists of –  
. . . 
(c) a scheme, rule or method of performing a 
mental act, playing a game or doing business, or 
                                                                                                             
27 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2353 (“We have described step two of this analysis as 
a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements 
that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly 
more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’”). 
28 European Patent Convention art. 52(2), Oct. 5, 1973, E.P.C. 110 (2013) 
(“The following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions . . .: (a) 
discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; (b) aesthetic 
creations; (c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing 
games or doing business, and programs for computers; (d) presentations of 
information”), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/ 
epc/2013/e/ar52.html. Other policy exclusions, such as medical methods, are 
also provided in Art. 53; however, detailed discussion of such lies outside of the 
current scope of this Article. 
8
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a program for a computer; 
. . .  
but the foregoing provision shall prevent anything 
from being treated as an invention for the purposes 
of this Act only to the extent that a patent or 
application for a patent relates to that thing as 
such.29 
 
B.  The Analytic Framework 
 
Determination of subject-matter eligibility requires a four-step 
analysis, as clarified by the England and Wales Court of Appeals 
in Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd. (the Aerotel approach): 
1. Properly construe the claims; 
2. Identify the actual (or alleged) contribution; 
3. Ask whether it falls solely within the excluded 
subject matter; and 
4. Check whether the actual or alleged contribution 
is actually technical in nature.30 
In this light, when interpreting whether a computer program makes 
a “contribution that is actually technical in nature,” one must 
consider five aspects: 
1. Whether the claimed technical effect has a 
technical effect on a process which is carried on 
outside of the computer; 
2. Whether the claimed technical effect operates at 
the level of the architecture of the computer–that is 
to say, whether the effect is produced irrespective of 
the data being processed or the application being 
                                                                                                             
29 Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 1(2)(c) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/patentsact1977.pdf. 
30 Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, [40] 
(Eng.). 
9
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run; 
3. Whether the claimed technical effect results in 
the computer being made to operate in a new way; 
4. Whether the program made the computer a better 
computer in the sense of running more efficiently 
and effectively as a computer; and  
5. Whether the perceived problem is overcome by 
the claimed invention as opposed to merely being 
circumvented.31 
The United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office further explains 
the underlying policy as follows: 
Some computer-implemented inventions are 
patentable whilst others are not. This is because 
software straddles the technological and business 
worlds. It uses technology, that is, computers, but 
often for non-technical purposes. Whether a 
computer-implemented invention is patentable 
depends on the contribution the invention makes. 
For example, if it provides improved control of a 
car braking system, it is likely to be patentable, but 
if it merely provides an improved accounting 
system, it is probably not patentable.32 
It may be readily noticed that the policy objectives and analytical 
framework employed in the U.K. seems to echo the United States 




                                                                                                             
31 HTC Europe Co. Ltd. v. Apple Inc., [2013] EWCA (Civ) 451, [50] 
(Eng.). 
32 Press Release, The U.K. Patent Office, Patent Office issues Practice 
Notice on Patentability of Computer Programs and Business Methods (Dec. 23, 
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C.  Concurrence with Alice 
 
The two steps of the Alice analysis are strikingly similar to the 
last two steps of the Aerotel approach. Specifically, in the third 
step, the Aerotel approach asks “whether the claims fall within 
excluded subject matter (i.e., are ‘abstract’),” and in the fourth step 
inquires into whether the alleged contribution is “actually technical 
in nature.”33 
Here, the factors that Alice considers as “significantly more” in 
the second step of the analysis (i.e., improvements to another 
technology or technical field, or improvements to the functioning 
of the computer itself)34 are echoed in the Aerotel approach 
considerations as outlined in HTC Europe (i.e. “technical effect on 
a process which is carried on outside of the computer,” or “results 
in the computer being made to operate in a new way . . . made the 
computer a better computer in the sense of running more 
efficiently and effectively as a computer.”).35 
 
D.  The Conflict with U.S.P.T.O. Guidance 
 
A key distinction is that, whereas the Aerotel approach requires 
that the “technical effect” relate to “the actual or alleged 
contribution” of the disclosed invention, the current guidance put 
forth by the U.S.P.T.O. states that “any element, or combination of 
elements, in the claim” may be sufficient to provide subject matter 
eligibility.36 As such, the U.S.P.T.O. guidance also misconstrues 
Alice. 
Specifically, the Court in Alice clarified that the second step 
necessitates “a search for an ‘inventive concept.’”37 By then 
                                                                                                             
33 Aerotel, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371 at [40]. 
34 Id. 
35 HTC Europe, [2013] EWCA (Civ) 451 at [50]. 
36 See Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld to the Patent Examining 
Corps, supra note 18, at 3 (emphasis added). 
37 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2353 (2014) (“We have 
described step two of this analysis as a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., 
an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the 
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the 
[ineligible concept] itself.’”). 
11
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allowing “any element,” irrespective of whether the element 
directly relates to the “inventive concept,” to be sufficient in the 
Alice analysis, the “search for the inventive concept” is rendered 
moot and irrelevant. Moreover, as discussed above, consideration 
of “any element” also invites the sort of formulaic and ancillary 
claim drafting derided by the Court in Alice “Such a result would 
make the determination of patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the 
draftsman’s art.’”38 
 
III. DEVELOPING A CONCRETE ALICE FRAMEWORK 
 
The similarity in both analytic framework and policy objectives 
of the well-developed Aerotel approach to the Alice analysis 
provides an opportunity to look to the U.K.’s jurisprudence as 
persuasive authority. Doing so would also advance the laudable 
goal of reducing international inconsistencies relative to patent 
subject-matter eligibility. 
 
A.  Identification of the Actual (or Alleged) Contribution 
 
The Court in Alice mandated looking beyond the claims of the 
patent and evaluating the “inventive concept” in making a 
determination as to subject matter eligibility.39 In this light, 
identification of the “inventive concept” should be included in a 
properly applied Alice analytic framework. The Aerotel approach 
could be instructive in this regard. 
As to the identification of the inventive contribution, Lord 
Justice Jacob provided in Aerotel: “[I]t is an exercise in judgment 
probably involving the problem said to be solved, how the 
invention works, what its advantages are. What has the inventor 
really added to human knowledge perhaps best sums up the 
exercise. The formulation involves looking at substance not 
form.”40 The statement fits well into the discussion provided in 
                                                                                                             
38 Id. at 2359 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)); see also 
id. at 2349, 2357, 2364. 
39 Id. at 2353, 2357–58. 
40 Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, [40] 
(Eng.). 
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Alice. Moreover, in the United States patent practitioners and 
examiners have the tools at hand to assist in the identification of 
the inventive concept because applicants are required to provide an 
abstract as a part of their disclosure.41 The abstract should provide 
“the nature and gist of the technical disclosure and should include 
that which is new in the art.”42 This correlates directly to the 
determination of what the inventor “really added to human 
knowledge.”43 
Applicants should also provide a background and summary of 
the invention.44 The background should include “the problems 
involved in the prior art or other information disclosed which are 
solved by the applicant’s invention,”45 and the summary should 
“set out the exact nature, operation, and purpose of the 
invention.”46 These correlate directly to the determination of “the 
problem said to be solved, how the invention works, and what its 
advantages are.”47 
A regretfully common practice among patent practitioners in 
the United States is regurgitating claim language in the abstract 
and summary. Such practice not only subverts the requirements set 
forth in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (M.P.E.P.)48 
and adds mere surplusage, but also devalues the disclosure and 
makes proper identification of the “inventive concept” unduly 
burdensome. As such, encouraging more frequent issuance and 
maintenance of objections to improper abstract and summary 
should be considered. 
 
                                                                                                             
41 37 C.F.R. § 1.72 (2014); M.P.E.P. § 608.01(b) (2014). 
42 M.P.E.P. § 608.01(b) (2014). 
43 Aerotel, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371 at [43]. 
44 37 C.F.R. 1.73 (2014); M.P.E.P. § 608.01(c), (d) (2014). 
45 M.P.E.P. § 608.01(c) (2014). 
46 Id. § 608.01(d). 
47 See Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, [43] 
(Eng.). 
48 The M.P.E.P. is published by the U.S.P.T.O. and outlines the laws and 
regulations that must be followed in the examination of patent applications in 
the United States. A current copy of the M.P.E.P. may be accessed at: 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/. 
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B.  Direct Connection of “Significantly More” with “Inventive 
Concept” 
 
The Court in Alice noted that the second step of the analysis 
involves identification of the “inventive concept.”49 The 
requirement of connecting the “inventive concept” to the 
“something more” is illustrated in the Court’s discussion of 
Diehr.50 In the discussion, the Court points out the “inventive 
concept”—in this case, “to record constant temperature 
measurements inside the rubber mold—something ‘the industry 
ha[d] not been able to obtain.’”51 The steps of recalculating the 
cure time by computer—i.e., the formula—were transformed in 
connection with “something more” that “the industry had not been 
able to obtain”—i.e., the “inventive concept.”52 Thus, Alice 
requires a direct connection of the “significantly more” to the 
“inventive concept.”53 
 
C.  Consideration Provides Both Practical and Policy Advantages 
 
In consideration of the analysis, results, and policy objectives 
of the Aerotel approach and those outlined or inferred by the Court 
in Alice, review of the jurisprudence of U.K. as a persuasive 
authority may be useful. Doing so would yield several notable 
advantages. 
As noted by the Intellectual Property Office, there is extensive 
                                                                                                             
49 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (“We have 
described step two of this analysis as a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., 
an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the 
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the 
[ineligible concept] itself.’”). 
50 See id. at 2358–59. 
51 Id. (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 178 & n.3 (1981)). 
52 See id. at 2359. 
53 Note the similarity in the narrative provided by the U.K. Patent Office: 
“Whether a computer-implemented invention is patentable depends on the 
contribution the invention makes. For example, if it provides improved control 
of a car braking system, it is likely to be patentable.” Press Release, U.K. Patent 
Office, supra note 32. 
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case law about computer-implemented inventions in the U.K.54 
The Aerotel approach has been used and developed in that 
jurisdiction since 2006.55 This provides an extensive source of 
information relative to a very similar standard to that required by 
Alice. 
Additionally, the analytic approach in the U.K. is more 
concrete in structure, while fitting into the framework of Alice. 
This allows the advantage of considering the approaches of U.K. 
jurisprudence as potentially instructive where the U.S. law is still 
less evolved. Doing so would allow the findings to be tested and 
tried in the course of development of U.S. authority. 
Finally, although individual countries in the European Union 
may have slightly varying interpretations on the law as it relates to 
subject matter patentability of computer-implemented inventions, 
they are generally in conformance with each other.56 Therefore, 
using the opportunity presented by Alice to further develop the law 
in the United States by considering the parallel approach in the 
U.K. would reduce the conflict of laws as it relates to patent-
eligibility of computer-implemented inventions. Both invention 
and utilization of computer-implemented technologies are global in 
nature. Reduction of the conflict in laws governing patent-
eligibility of such transatlantic innovation will likely reduce costs 




The U.K.’s law and jurisprudence relative to patent eligibility 
of computer-implemented innovation is strikingly similar to and 
fits within the framework of analysis mandated by the United 
States Supreme Court’s ruling in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank 
International. Both the bench and bar in the United States would 
benefit from looking to the U.K. as a source of persuasive 
authority. Doing so would yield benefits of faster development of 
law in the United States by employing and testing best practices 
developed in the U.K. since 2006. Additionally, moving towards 
                                                                                                             
54 Press Release, U.K. Patent Office, supra note 32. 
55 Press Release, U.K. Patent Office, supra note 32. 
56 Press Release, U.K. Patent Office, supra note 32. 
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greater uniformity of laws across the Atlantic, as is now possible 
with Alice, would reduce conflict of laws and thus spur innovation. 
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